Carl von Clausewitz is die author of history’s most studied and quoted book on the art of war, Vom Kriege (On War). In presenting his theories on the interaction of politics, the military, and the population, in combination with his concept of “friction” of the elements of chance and circumstance, Clausewitz influenced the thinking of military leaders from the mid-1800s to the present. He also directly influenced reforms within the Prussian army that led to the defeat of NAPOLEON I and designed the military organization of die general staffs employed by the Prussian and, later, the German armies as well as systematic procedures for the training and development of officers. Von Clausewitz was a soldier all his adult life. Born on June 1, 1780, near Magdeburg, Prussia, the son of a retired military officer, Clausewitz joined the army at the age of twelve and saw his first combat against the French within a year. In 1801, he gained acceptance to the newly formed military academy in Berlin, where he studied FREDERICK THE GREAT and Machiavelli as well as the military history of Prussia and other great nations.
Following graduation, Clausewitz returned to the ranks and in 1806 was captured by the French during the Battle of Prenzlau. His one-year captivity gave Clausewitz time to ponder the concepts of warfare before he returned to Prussia and became the private instructor of the crown prince and a department head in the ministry of war. As a part of his instruction of the prince, Clausewitz wrote a monograph, later published as Principles of War, which dis¬cussed the relationship between offense and defense and the importance of knowing when to make the transition from one to the other. He also predicted that Napoleon would be unsuccessful if he invaded Russia because of the advances in the Russian army, the distances involved, and the severity of that country’s winter.
In 1812, Clausewitz, like many of his fellow officers, who believed it was not in their country’s best interests, refused to participate in the enforced Prussian alliance with former enemy France and deserted rather than assist Napoleon in his war against Russia. Instead, Clausewitz joined the Russian army and for two years served in various positions, including chief of staff of an infantry corps and the negotiator who convinced the Prussian army to change sides and join the Russians against the French.
Reinstated in the Prussian army after it allied with Russia, Clausewitz served for the remainder of the war against Napoleon and in 1818 earned a promotion to major general and an appointment as the head of the War College in Berlin. For more than a decade he dedicated his efforts to reorganizing the Prussian army and to recording his military philosophies in what would become On War. In 1830 he joined the Prussian Corps of Observers during the Polish Revolution. While there, he contracted cholera at age fifty-one and died on November 16, 1831, after his return to Breslau.
At the time of his death, Clausewitz had not completed his lengthy manuscript on military theory. His widow, Marie, began assembling her husband’s various writings in 1832 and over die next five years published ten volumes of his works. The first three, which made up On War, proved to be the most pertinent. In his writings, Clausewitz advocated viewing war and politics as one, maintaining that warfare must remain under the direction of the political leaders to achieve its aims. He simply stated this relationship: “War is the continuation of politics by other means.”
Clausewitz also attempted to reduce military operations to a science. He emphasized the concept of “friction,” which he de¬fined as the fatigue, minor errors, and chance or luck that cause good plans to yield failure instead of success. He added that to achieve any gain one must always base theory on fact and noted that objectives which might appear to be easy may very well prove difficult, if not impossible. Throughout his writings, Clausewitz stated that the primary mission of an army must be to engage and destroy the enemy’s main force in a decisive battle. A general strategy should focus on this destruction of the enemy army.
Clausewitz recognized that for a general to win decisive battles and, in turn, achieve political objectives, commanders, as well as their soldiers, must believe in their cause and possess a high state of morale. According to On War, “a powerful emotion must stimulate the great ability of a military leader, whether it be ambition as in Caesar; hatred of the enemy, as in Hannibal; or the pride of glorious defeat, as in Frederick the Great. Open your heart to such emotion, determined to find a glorious end, and fate will crown your youthful brow with a shining glory, which is the ornament of princes, and engrave your image in the hearts of your last descendants.”
Within his extensive writings, Clausewitz recorded his desire to write a book on war “which would not be forgotten in two or three years.” He certainly surpassed his objective. Although the wridngs of ANTOINE HENRI JOMINI were much more widely read around the world during the nineteenth century, the Prussian army considered Clausewitz the author of their Bible of military theory. As time passed, however, the advocates of Clausewitz grew, while those of Jomini decreased. By the twentieth century, officers in armies both large and small were studying Clausewitz.
In a preface to the fifteenth edition of On War, published in 1937, the German minister of war, General Von Blomberg, wrote, “In spite of all changes of military organization and technique, Clausewitz’s book On War remains for all times the basis of any meaningful development of the art of war.”