In the Fourth Century B.C., Sun Tzu (400-330 B.C.)wrote the Chinese classic Ping-fa (The Art of War), which is one of the earliest-known compilations of military theory and strategy. For centuries the twenty- five thousand word treatise, divided into thirteen chapters, has provided the principal doctrine for Chinese warfare and heavily influenced the Japanese. In modern times, Mao ZEDONG closely studied the guidance provided in the book during his struggle to lead the Communist takeover of China. Vo NGUYEN Giap did likewise during both the First and Second Indochina Wars. Today revolutionary and conventional army leaders alike, as well as captains of business and industry, seek guidance from The Art of War. For some it remains a mere primer; for others it stands as die Bible of warfare.
Some Chinese historians place Sun Tzu as early as the sixth century B.C., but the contents of The Art of War itself give more credence to origins in the fourth century B.C. There is some evidence that Sun Tzu served in the army of the king of Wu, and his name appears in documents as the military leader who captured the Chu’u capital of Ying. In other accounts, Sun Tzu receives credit for the defeat of the northern Chinese states of Chi’i and Chin. One of the most repeated stories about Sun Tzu is how he used hundreds of Wu’s concubines as “soldiers” to demonstrate to his king how soldiers should perform various military drills and movements.
For centuries after its introduction, the Chinese, and later the Mongolians, studied and followed the contents of The Art of War. The first complete translation of the thirteen chapters into Japan¬ese took place about A.D. 760, but there is strong evidence that at least parts of the work appeared in Japan several hundred years earlier. The Art of War did not come to the attention of the West¬ern world until 1722, when a Jesuit missionary to Peking, Father J. I. M. Arnott, translated and published it in Paris. The translation appeared in print again in a 1782 anthology which the well-read NAPOLEON I [2] probably acquired. Translations of the work into Russian, German, and English followed in the next century. Today, of the half-dozen English translations available, the 1963 version by Samuel B. Griffith, which is an expansion of his 1960 Oxford University thesis, attracts the widest audience.
Warfare, far from an exact science, defies definitive rules and directions and adapts poorly to the academic classroom. Nevertheless, The Art of War is a record of the first effort to provide rational thought as the basis for the planning and conduct of combat. Much of Sun Tzu’s advice seems extremely simple; even so, hundreds of years of conflict demonstrate repeated violations of the most fundamental principles.
The two basic tenets of The Art of War are to prepare adequate defenses to repel any attack and to seek ways to defeat the enemy. An important aspect of the latter objective, and perhaps the most difficult to implement, is to seek methods to defeat an enemy without actually engaging him in battle. Griffith writes in the Preface of his translation that Sun Tzu believed “that the skill- ul strategist should be able to subdue the enemy’s army without engaging it, to take his cities without laying siege to them, and to overthrow his State without bloodying swords.”
According to Sun Tzu, military might is the last resort. Before engaging in combat, one should try other tactics, such as spreading rumors in the enemy camp, bribing and influencing opposing leaders, and other-wise undermining morale and capabilities. Sun Tzu encouraged detailed reconnaissance and the gathering of information on the enemy and the terrain before undertaking battle. He also noted, “No country has ever benefited from a protracted war,” and advocated rapid, decisive offensives.
Often quoted axioms from The Art of War include “Know the enemy, know yourself, and your victory will be inevitable” and “Avoid strength, attack weakness.” His analysis of successful commanders is equally straightforward: “They defend when strength is inadequate and attack when strength is abundant.”
Although Sun Tzu wrote the original text as a guide for con¬ventional operations, developments in the twentieth century have given The Art of War much creditability as a manual for guerrilla warfare. Mao in China and Giap in Vietnam studied Sun Tzu; sales of Griffith’s translation in the United States soared during the Viet¬nam War. British military writer B. H. Liddell Hart, in his foreword to Griffith’s translation, wrote, “Among all the military thinkers of the past, only Clausewitz is compar-able, and even he is more ‘dated’ than Sun Tzu . . . Sun Tzu has clearer vision, more pro¬found insight, and eternal freshness.”
Sun Tzu’s thirteen chapters—“Estimates,” “Waging War,” “Offensive Strategy,” “Dispositions,” “Energy,” “Weaknesses and Strengths,” “Maneuver,” “The Nine Variables,” “Marches,” ‘Terrain,” ‘The Nine Varieties of Ground,” “Attack by Fire,” and “Employment of Secret Agents”—continue to provide an efficient oudine for any study of the elusive art of war. Sun Tzu’s study did it first and, surprisingly, as well as or better than anyone who has followed. The Art of War is simple, readable, and appropriate for every military classroom and soldier’s pack.
As Liddel Hart stated, although Sun Tzu is more current and fresher than Clausewitz, the latter, with his European orientation, has had a greater influence on military history than either Sun Tzu or ANTOINE HENRI JOMINI. None of the three made any great personal contributions on the batdefield, yet all three have left a more lasting influence than many great battie captains.