Some objections have also been urged against the cabinet system, as follows:
It causes too frequent ministerial changes and leads to instability of governments.
One of the serious defects of the cabinet system is th impermanence and instability of the government The cabinet has no fixe term of office. It holds office only so long as it has the support an confidence of the majority in the legislature. It is, however, subject to th vagaries of the representatives and the intrigues of the parties an politicians in the parliament, especially in the popular chamber, to whic ihe cabinet is really responsible. These defects are aggravated if th dominant majority is small or incoherent, as it is when the cabinet is coalition ministry. It is formed by several parties, one or more of which ma be constantly intriguing with the opposition parties to oust the existin cabinet from office.
These are the reasons why such cabinets are unstabl especially in countries with multiple parties, as in France, Pakistan, et< Even in England, where only two parties exist, cabinets are quite ofite changed. TTie frequent ministerial changes cause inconsistency i government policy, make the government weak and unstable and prevent to adopt long-term policy and plans. Every new cabinet necessarily follow ;i new policy and new program in order to justify its assumption of powe by reversing the policy and plans of the old. Hence the cabinet system is nc conducive to continuity in policy and stability in government. This was th reason which caused discontent and dislike of the parliamentary form c government in many countries and led to the rise of fascist or nationalis dictatorships in Italy, Germany and other countries before the World War I] and after it in de Gaullist France and Nasser’s Egypt. It does not suit newly independent and developing countries.
It is too largely a system of party government
Modern governments are necessarily party governments. But th< cabinet government is too much of it. The cabinet system divides thi country into two groups of men and parties, one of which tries hard to ge things done and the other equally hard to obstruct them. In theory, th< criticism and opposition of the government policy and legislative proposal: by the opposition party or parties is to prevent the adoption of bad laws o policies. But in practice, they are opposed for the sake of opposition and fo overthrowing the existing government. As Lord Bryce remarked, th< parliamentary system “intensifies the spirit of party and keeps it always oi the boil. Even if there are no important issues of policy before the nation there are always the offices to be fought for. One party holds them, th< other desires them, and the conflict is unending”. The result is that the part) interests are placed above national interests, and the progress of the countr) is retarded, as national time, energy and money are wasted in party quarTel: and squabbles. These defects are not so great under a two-party system, bul become acute under the multiple party system.
It leads to cabinet dictatorship.
Formerly, the parliaments had enough time to discuss the legislative proposals before them or consider the cabinet policy thoroughly before they passed the bill or approved the policy. But in recent times, their size has become too large and unwieldy and their time limited by the pressure of work and their procedure tied by party considerations and discipline for any effective discussion and deliberation. Hence the parliaments have left them to a handful of persons or leaders in the cabinet, contenting themselves as mere voting and controlling bodies, as for example, it is illustrated by ten year rule of the Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher. This has increased the importance and powers of the cabinet and of the prime minister.
They have become the virtual rulers, armed with absolute powers, acquired by strict party discipline and rigid control of the parliament. This fact is particularly true of England, where, owing to the two-party system, party discipline and control is most rigid. It has become practically impossible to remove cabinet from office, as it rigidly controls the majority in the parliament by party discipline. That is the reason why English cabinet have a longer tenure of office. Ramsay Muir has rightly said that the cabinet system leads to the “dictatorship of one man or a small group of men exercised through a subservient party majority of more or less tied members.” The dictatorship of the cabinet is really the dictatorship of the prime minister. The redeeming factor of this dictatorship is that it is not autocratic and irresponsible, for the prime minister exercises it so long as he has the backing of his party and the party remains in power only so long as it has the majority votes of the people. It is under a constant fire of criticism in the parliament, press and the public.
It is a government by amateurs.
When a new cabinet is to be formed, the prime minister-designate docs not select his colleagues on the basis of their training or talent for administration and government which they may perhaps have none, but on the basis of party service and loyalty. His choice is really determined by his desire to form a stable ministry, supported by a strong majority in the parliament. The result is that he selects men who are loyal party followers and leaders but have no experience or knowledge of administration and government. During their tenure of office, they are constantly busy with parliamentary debates and even harassed by its questionings and pressure of work and have little time or inclination to devote themselves to the work of their departments. Moreover, the quick cabinet changes deprive them of the opportunity to be fully acquainted with their departmental duties. So the cabinet ministers remain amateurs in politics and government. This criticism is, however, exaggerated.
Every cabinet includes men who have held a ministerial office in earlier cabinets and have long experience of departmental business. The ministers are policy-makers and not departmental experts. Lastly, their amateurism is also an advantage over an •Xpert. An amateur sees a thing as a whole, while an expert sees its details. A cabinet minister, being an amateur, takes a broader view of his department’s work than an expert would do. He can, therefore, co-ordinate III work and activities much better and more efficiently than the expert. As Ramsay Macdonald, one of the Prime Ministers of England only, said, “The cabinet is the bridge linking up the people with the expert, joining principle lo practise. It does not himself keep the departments going; it keeps them doing in a certain direction.”
The Cabinets are constantly growing in size.
One of the serious difficulties of the parliamentary governments is Ihc constant increase in the size and work of the cabinets. A cabinet is aptly ilcucribed as the executive committee of the parliament to discuss, decide ■nd propose legislative measures and other governmental actions before the legislature and secure approval of its policy. But it can properly fulfil these (Unctions only if it is small in size and is free from unnecessary burden of work. A century ago, the English cabinets consisted of hardly a dozen men, hut now they are sometimes as large as 21 men, while the ministry consists of more than seventy men. In Pakistan, during a short span of its history the cabinets had nearly doubled in size. Moreover, as the duties of the ministers have multiplied manifold, they become harassed by overwork. Too large Cabinets are useless for prompt and effective discussion and decisions. Too much work makes the ministers rely upon the permanent staff of their departments, which leads to bureaucracy and red-tapism. The remedy of these evils is to reduce the size of the cabinets or have “inner cabinets’.
Cabinet system is sometimes also criticised on the ground that it Violates the principle of the separation of powers as it combines and Concentrates executive and legislative powers in the hands of a cabinet. But It is not a sound criticism. The theory of the separation of powers is itself not a sound principle of organising the executive and legislative functions Of the State. It is, as Laski puts it, “the forcible disjunction of things naturally connected.” The combination and collaboration between the executive and the legislative is a merit rather than a demerit of the cabinet lystem.